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Issues in the Third Circuit
THE CITX DECISION: HAS THE TORT OF "DEEPENING
INSOLVENCY" GONE BANKRUPT?

I.

INTRODUCTION

In times of financial crisis, a corporation's board of directors often
faces the complex question of how to maximize asset value for all stakeholders and must frequently decide whether to prevent seemingly irreversible losses by liquidating assets or whether to try to preserve the corporate
entity by incurring more debt.' Deepening insolvency is a cause of action
based on the underlying premise that, at some point, it is more beneficial
for a corporation to cease operations, liquidate its assets and distribute the
proceeds to creditors rather than continue to operate and incur unnecessary additional debt.2 If a board of directors continues to operate beyond
the point when it arguably should have liquidated, some courts, recognizing that such action gives rise to cognizable harm, allow stakeholders to

1. See, e.g., John H. Rapisardi, Third Circuit Revisits "DeepeningInsolvency Theory," N.Y.L.J., July 20, 2006, at 3 (noting one choice that corporate management
must make when facing insolvency is whether to liquidate assets or to incur additional debt). Insolvency typically is defined as a "financial condition such that the
sum of such entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's property, at a fair
valuation exclusive of [exempt property]." See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (32) (A) (ii) (2001).
A generally accepted definition of stakeholder is "any group or individual who can
affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives." See Benedict Sheehy, Scrooge-the Reluctant Shareholder: Theoretical Problems in the ShareholderStakeholder Debate, 14 U. MiAMi Bus. L. REV. 193, 198 (2005) (quoting R. EDWARD
FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 46 (1984)) (defining stakeholder).
2. SeeSchachtv. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1350 (7th Cir. 1983) (discussing methods by which corporations can maximize value for shareholders). The Third Circuit has defined deepening insolvency as "an injury to the Debtor's corporate
property from the fraudulent expansion of corporate debt and prolongation of
corporate life." See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co.,
267 F.3d 340, 350 (3d Cir. 2001) (defining deepening insolvency). For a complete
discussion of the court's holding in Lafferty, see infra notes 28-41 and accompanying text. One commentator has characterized a typical deepening insolvency case
as one in which "an insolvent corporation's trustee, receiver, or creditors' committee, standing legally in the insolvent corporation's shoes, sue the corporation's
insiders and its deep-pocket outside professionals alleging that the defendants injured the corporation through wrongdoing that caused the corporation to incur
unpayable debt that deepened the corporation's insolvency." SeeJ.B. Heaton, Deepening Insolvency, 30 J. CORP. L. 465, 465-66 (2005) (detailing components of deepening insolvency claim).

(995)
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undersue the board and other corporate insiders (e.g., auditors, lawyers,
3
writers and even lenders) for the tort of deepening insolvency.
As one might imagine, judicial acceptance of this tort has incited vociferous debate over the prudence of circumventing the business judgment rule and placing liability for this insolvency directly on corporate
management. 4 Some commentators argue that courts have increased the
likelihood that a corporation's board of directors, fearing liability, will
choose to liquidate its assets as opposed to making a good faith effort to
resuscitate a company approaching financial crisis. 5 Stakeholders assert,
however, that the tort of deepening insolvency merely ensures that corporate management makes fiscally responsible business decisions that maxi6
mize value.
3. See, e.g., Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 347 (holding that creditors can sue for deepening corporations' insolvency); see also, e.g., OHC Liquidation Trust v. Credit Suisse
First Boston (In re Oakwood Homes Corp.), 340 B.R. 510, 530-31 (Bankr. D. Del.
2006) (stating that Delaware, New York and North Carolina would recognize deepening insolvency causes of action); Stanziale v. Pepper Hamilton LLP, (In re Student Fin. Corp.), 335 B.R. 539, 548 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005) (upholding deepening
insolvency); Miller v. Dutil (In re Total Containment, Inc.), 335 B.R. 589, 619
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2005) (same); In re LTV Steel Co., 333 B.R. 397, 422 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 2005) (discussing growing acceptance of deepening insolvency); Official
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Exide Techs.,
Inc.), 299 B.R. 732, 752 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (recognizing deepening insolvency
as independent cause of action).
4. CompareJay Bender, Deepening Insolvency in Alabama: Is it a Tort, a Damages
Theory orNeitherof the Above?, 66 ALA. LAw. 190, 194 (2005) (recognizing that corporations are under no duty to liquidate when faced with insolvency, and therefore
business judgment rule protects corporate management from liability within zone
of insolvency), Douglas Richmond, Rebecca Lamberth & Ambreen Delawalla, Lawyer Liability and the Vortex of Deepening Insolvency, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 127, 156-57
(2006) (noting that business judgment rule allows corporate management to take
risks necessary to maximize profit), and Sabin Willett, The Shallows of DeepeningInsolvency, 60 Bus. LAw. 549, 561 (2005) (concluding that business judgment rule
should foreclose most actions for deepening insolvency), with Susan Gummow, Directorand OfficerLiability Insurance:How Bankruptcy Transforms the Rights of the Various
Parties, 14J. BN'Y.R. L. & PAc.6, 15 (2005) ("[T]he protections of the business
judgment rule may not fully apply once the corporation is in the zone of insolvency."). The business judgment rule effectively immunizes corporate management from liability when it has acted on "an informed basis, in good faith, and in
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company."
See Daniel E. Harrell, Comment, Pandora'sBankruptcy Tort: The Potentialfor Circumvention of the BusinessJudgment Rule Through the Tort Theory of Deepening Insolvency, 36
CUMB. L. REv. 151, 168 (2005-06) (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 802, 812 (Del.
1984)) (providing practical effects of business judgment rule). For a discussion of
the effects of the business judgment rule on corporate liability and corporate governance, see infra notes 56, 76, 118-23 and accompanying text.
5. See Harrell, supra note 4, at 152-54 (noting that extending deepening insolvency to claims of negligence "could provide a cause of action distinct from a
breach of fiduciary duty claim, [and] officers and directors would be unable to rely
on the protection of the business judgment rule," which in turn would make it far
more likely that directors would liquidate when confronted with insolvency).
6. See Michael Bernstein & Charles Malloy, Deepening Insolvency: An Emerging
Theory of Liability, 1 BLOOMBERG CORP. LAw. J. 406, 415 (2006), available at http://
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Although coined over twenty years ago, there is a distinct lack of consensus among courts regarding the amorphous tort of deepening insolvency. 7 Questions remain as to whether deepening insolvency is in fact an
independent cause of action or a measure of damages and whether negligence alone suffices to establish liability for such claims. 8 The Third Circuit has largely been at the forefront of these issues, and in two recent
cases, has both vastly expanded and severely narrowed the tort of deepening insolvency. 9 In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditorsv. RF. Lafferty &
Co.,1 0 the Third Circuit boldly established the tort of deepening insolvency
as an independent cause of action.' 1 Then, five years later, as a reaction
to various misinterpretations of the Lafferty holding, the court clarified its
www.arnoldporter.com/pubs/files/Deepeing-Insolvency.pdf ("To a cynic (or a
defendant) [deepening insolvency] is unfair Monday-morning quarterbacking. To
a plaintiff, it is simply a way of requiring that parties who have influence over the
debtor make business decisions that are reasonably calculated to maximize value,
even if value is maximized through liquidation.").
7. Certain courts have treated deepening insolvency as an independent cause
of action, while others have treated deepening insolvency simply as a theory of
damages. Compare Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 349-52 (holding that expansion of corporate debt can cause injury to debtor's corporate property that is actionable on
independent basis of deepening insolvency), and Exide, 299 B.R. at 752 (recognizing deepening insolvency as independent cause of action), with Hannover Corp. of
Am. v. Beckner, 211 B.R. 849, 854 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1997) (recognizing deepening
insolvency as method of calculating corporation's damages, which include amount
of indebtedness incurred from prolonging life of insolvent business), and Allard v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 924 F. Supp. 488, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (indicating deepening insolvency is theory of damages). Still other courts have rejected deepening
insolvency as a theory of damages and as a viable separate cause of action altogether. See Fla. Dep't of Ins. v. Chase Bank of Tex. Nat'l Ass'n, 274 F.3d 924, 93536 (5th Cir. 2001) (questioning whether Texas law recognizes tort of deepening
insolvency as distinct cause of action); Alberts v. Tuft (In re Greater Se. Cmty.
Hosp. Corp.), 333 B.R. 506, 517 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2005) (striking deepening insolvency as cause of action); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of VarTec
Telecom, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Fin. Coop. (In reVarTec Telecom, Inc.), 335 B.R. 631,
644 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) (refusing to recognize deepening insolvency as theory of damages or independent cause of action); Coroles v. Sabey, 79 P.3d 974, 983
(Utah Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting deepening insolvency as theory of damages).
8. Cf supra note 7 (providing list of courts that have ruled on deepening insolvency claims and describing their various approaches to them).
9. Compare Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey & Assoc., P.C. (In re CitX Corp.), 448
F.3d 672, 676 (3d Cir. 2006) (rejecting deepening insolvency as theory of damages
and prohibiting deepening insolvency claims from being asserted solely on negligence), with Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 349 (holding that deepening insolvency was independent cause of action), and infra notes 28-41 and accompanying text (discussing
court's holding in Lafferty and manner by which Third Circuit greatly expanded
claims for deepening insolvency). For an analysis of how the court's holding in
CitX reined in deepening insolvency, see infra notes 78-105 and accompanying
text.
10. 267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir. 2001).
11. See id. at 347-50 (establishing deepening insolvency as separate and distinct cause of action). For a discussion of the court's holding in Lafferty, see infra
notes 28-41 and accompanying text.
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ruling in Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey and Associates (In re CitX Corp.) 12 by severely limiting deepening insolvency's broad reach. 3 The CitXcourt held
that allegations of negligence alone do not support a claim of deepening
insolvency and that deepening insolvency may not be used as a theory of
damages. 1 4 The court also expressly limited Lafferty's precedential value
15
to matters governed by Pennsylvania law.
This Casebrief identifies the current status of deepening insolvency
within Third Circuit jurisprudence and serves as a guide to practitioners
bringing or defending against a claim of deepening insolvency. 16 Part II
provides a review of the economic theories that led to the development of
deepening insolvency and examines how various circuit courts have analyzed and interpreted challenges brought under this contemporary theory
of liability. 17 Part III details the holding in CitX and the way in which the
Third Circuit limited deepening insolvency claims.' 8 Part IV reviews
CitX's widespread effect on deepening insolvency jurisprudence within the
Third Circuit as well as the unmistakable and growing trend, within federal jurisprudence, toward significantly restricting claims for deepening
insolvency. 19 Finally, Part V concludes that the constraints placed on
deepening insolvency by the court in CitXwill severely limit the number of
deepening insolvency claims brought by trustees and creditors against cor20
porations within the Third Circuit.

12. 448 F.3d 672 (3d Cir. 2006).
13. See id. at 677-78, 680 n.l, 681 (limiting claims for deepening insolvency).
For a detailed analysis of the way in which CitX further restricted Lafferty, see infra
notes 78-105 and accompanying text.
14. See CitX, 448 F.3d at 677-78, 681 (rejecting deepening insolvency as theory
of damages and refusing to extend deepening insolvency to negligent acts). For a
complete discussion of the court's holding in CitX, see infra notes 78-105 and accompanying text. For an analysis of the various ways lower courts interpreted the
Lafferty holding, see infra notes 44-77 and accompanying text.
15. See CitX, 448 F.3d at 680 n.II ("[N]othing we said in Lafferty compels any
extension of the doctrine beyond Pennsylvania."). For a thorough analysis of
CitX's refusal to extend Lafferty beyond Pennsylvania, see infra notes 103-05 and
accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the status of deepening insolvency within the Third
Circuit, see infra notes 78-105 and accompanying text.
17. For further discussion of the historical development of deepening insolvency within the Third Circuit and more generally within federal jurisprudence,
see infra notes 42-77 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's holding in Cit, see infra notes 78105 and accompanying text.
19. For a complete discussion of CitXs wide-reaching impact on deepening
insolvency jurisprudence within the Third Circuit and beyond, see infra notes 10632 and accompanying text.
20. For support of this author's prediction that CitX will severely limit the
number of deepening insolvency claims brought by trustees and creditors in the
Third Circuit, see infra notes 111-32 and accompanying text.
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DEEPENING INSOLVENCY'S CONTEMPORARY ROOTS

ChallengingHistorical Notions of Liability from Insolvency

Deepening insolvency is a developing theory of liability that evolved
from cases concerning corporate officers who fraudulently extended the
lives of corporations for personal financial gain. 2 1 In what is widely considered the first allusion to deepening insolvency in American jurisprudence, a New York district court concluded in Bloor v. Dansker22 that "[a]
corporation is not a biological entity for which it can be presumed that any
act which extends its existence is beneficial to it."23 Three years later, the
Seventh Circuit further challenged established notions of who could be
deemed liable for a corporation's insolvency.2 4 In Schacht v. Brown,25 the
court stated that at some point in a corporation's lifetime-in an effort to
maximize asset value for stakeholders-it is more beneficial for a corporation to dissolve than to continue to operate, and that by deepening the
26
company's insolvency, corporate management harms the corporation.
The Seventh Circuit's seemingly straightforward decision in Schacht
brought the tort of deepening insolvency substantially closer to a viable
27
and separate cause of action.
B.

The Third Circuit Establishes Deepening Insolvency as an Independent
Cause of Action

The Third Circuit's controversial opinion in Lafferty crystallized the
underlying theories that led to the development of deepening insolvency
21. See Bloor v. Dansker (In re Investors Funding Corp. Sec. Litig.), 523 F.
Supp. 533, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (discussing fraudulent actions taken by corporate
management that led to incurrence of additional debt); see also Bernstein & Malloy, supra note 6, at 415 ("The early cases that gave rise to the concept of deepening insolvency involved officers and directors who were alleged to have
fraudulently prolonged the life of a corporation in order to benefit themselves,
and who argued that there was no harm to the corporation ....
.
22. 523 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
23. Id. at 541 (rejecting, in dicta, premise that it is always beneficial for corporate entity to remain solvent). The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that three
brothers manifested the false appearance of financial stability in an effort to conceal their past misconduct, and to raise additional capital to further their transgressions. See id. at 534 (stating factual background). This case represented the
first time a court discussed what would later become the tort of deepening insolvency. See Howard Seife, Bankruptcyfor Bankers, 122 BANKING L.J. 742, 743 (2005)
("The origin of the phrase 'deepening insolvency' has been traced to the case of
Bloor v. Dansker.").
24. See Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1350 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that
corporate entities can be damaged through deepening insolvency).
25. 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1983).
26. See id. at 1350 (rejecting earlier decisions that found extension of corporate existence is always beneficial and holding instead that "[t]his premise collides
with common sense, for the corporate body is ineluctably damaged by the deepening of its insolvency, through increased exposure to creditor liability").
27. See Willett, supra note 4, at 550 (concluding that deepening insolvency
evolved ever closer to independent action based on dictum in Schacht).
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28
In
and elevated the tort of deepening insolvency beyond mere dicta.
one fell swoop, the Third Circuit took the bold (and arguably misguided)
step of establishing deepening insolvency as a distinct and viable cause of
action under Pennsylvania law. 29 Resting its opinion on the reasoning
outlined by the Seventh Circuit in Schacht, the Third Circuit held that
Pennsylvania law recognized a cause of action for deepening insolvency as
"an injury to [a debtor's] corporate property from the fraudulent expan30
sion of corporate debt and prolongation of corporate life."

The seminal issue examined in Lafferty was whether an allegation of
deepening insolvency was sufficient to give a debtor standing in federal
court.3 1 The Third Circuit held that deepening insolvency was a viable
cause of action under Pennsylvania law and therefore the plaintiff had the
requisite standing to assert the claim. 32 Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not expressly recognized deepening insolvency as a distinct cause of action, the Third Circuit ruled that the theory of deepening
insolvency was "essentially sound" because an insolvent corporation retains
inherent value in its assets and corporate management seriously damages
28. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d
340, 347-50 (3d Cir. 2001) (establishing deepening insolvency as independent
cause of action resulting from incurrence of additional corporate debt serving to
prolong corporate entity).
29. See id. (holding deepening insolvency is separate and distinct cause of action that gives rise to actionable harm); see also Heaton, supra note 2, at 477-81
(noting significance of Lafferty in early development of deepening insolvency).
30. See Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 347 (defining deepening insolvency through Seventh Circuit's decision in Schacht). The Lafferty decision arose out of the bankruptcy of two leased financing corporations, which the Shapiro family owned and
allegedly operated as a part of a "Ponzi scheme." See id. at 343 (stating factual
background). A "Ponzi scheme" is defined as a "fraudulent investment scheme in
which money contributed by later investors generates artificially high dividends for
the original investors, whose example attracts ever larger investors." See BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 1198 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "Ponzi scheme"). In the present
case, due to financial hardship, one of the companies was unable to raise capital
sufficient to continue its business operations, and as such, the Shapiro family set
up a "limited purpose financing subsidiary" solely to provide a means by which to
sell debt securities under a different and untarnished business name. See Lafferty,
267 F.3d at 344-45 (stating factual background). Fraudulently marketing the second business as independent of the first allowed the family to incur large sums of
additional debt. See id. (same). The family also misrepresented financial statements for both of the companies for the purpose of inducing investment companies to sell additional debt certificates. See id. (same). For a detailed synopsis of
Lafferty's factual background, see Richmond et al., supra note 4, at 136.
31. See Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 349 ("[W]e must now determine whether the alleged theory of injury-deepening insolvency-is cognizable under Pennsylvania
law.").
32. See id. (affirming claim of deepening insolvency). The court held that "if
faced with the issue, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would determine that deepening insolvency may give rise to a cognizable injury." See id. (same). For a discussion of the court's rationale for establishing deepening insolvency as an
independent actionable tort, see infra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
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the remaining value of the corporation by incurring additional debt. 33
The court identified four ways in which deepening insolvency harms the
corporation. 34 The court noted that deepening insolvency harms the corporation by: (1) "inflicting legal and administrative costs" associated with
bankruptcy on the corporation; 35 (2) creating "operational limitations" on
the corporation that impede its ability to be profitable; 36 (3) undermining
customer, supplier and employee relationships; 37 and (4) shaking the confidence of parties dealing with the corporation, causing the devaluation of
corporate assets. 38 The court stated that "[t]hese harms can be averted,
and the value within an insolvent corporation salvaged, if the corporation
is dissolved in a timely manner, rather than kept afloat with spurious
debt." 3 9 In its ruling, the court further noted that the growing acceptance
of deepening insolvency in courtrooms across the country, as well as the
importance under Pennsylvania law of providing a remedy when there is
an injury, effectively cemented deepening insolvency as a valid cause of
action under Pennsylvania law.4 0 Under these precepts, the Third Circuit
33. See Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 349 (holding that although "[n]either the Pennsylvania Supreme Court nor any intermediate Pennsylvania court has directly addressed this issue," corporation was harmed by deepening insolvency). Whether a
jurisdiction recognizes claims for deepening insolvency is an issue whose ultimate
conclusion rests with state supreme courts. See id. at 349 (stating that insofar as
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not addressed issue, "we must don the soothsayer's garb and predict how that court would rule if it were presented with the
question").
34. For a discussion of the manner by which deepening insolvency harms corporations, see infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
35. See Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 349-50 (citing RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C.
MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 487 (5th ed. 1996)) (noting heightened
legal and administrative costs associated with deepening firm's insolvency).
36. See id. (citing BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 35, at 488-89) (discussing how
deepening insolvency can hinder corporation's ability to remain profitable).
37. See id. (illustrating negative effects that deepening insolvency may have on
outside parties).
38. See id. (describing harm to corporation's assets that can result from deepening insolvency).
39. See id. at 350 (noting methods by which corporations can limit their insolvency). To support the underpinnings of this controversial theory, the court
stated that the "acceptance of a rule which would bar a corporation from recovering damages due to the hiding of information concerning its insolvency would
create perverse incentives for wrong-doing officers and directors to conceal the
true financial condition of the corporation from the corporate body as long as
possible." See id. (ruling that corporations are harmed by deepening insolvency).
But see Willett, supranote 4, at 565 (rejecting proposition that debtor is harmed by
increasing insolvency).
40. See Lafferty, 267 F.2d at 352 ("In sum, we believe that the soundness of the
theory, its growing acceptance among courts, and the remedial theme in Pennsylvania law would persuade the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to recognize deepening insolvency as giving rise to a cognizable injury in the proper circumstances.");
accord Paul Rubin, New Liability UnderDeepening Insolvency-The Searchfor Deep Pockets, 23-Apr AM. BANKR. INST. J. 50, 68 (2004) (noting Lafferty's explicit acknowledgment of deepening insolvency as separate cause of action). Nevertheless, the court
went on to hold that the plaintiff was barred from bringing a claim on the debtors'
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laid the foundation for deepening insolvency as an independent cause of
4
action. 1
C.

The Unintended Consequences of Deepening Insolvency's Widening Reach

The Lafferty decision immediately sent shockwaves through the business community, which was unsure of the depths deepening insolvency
might reach and was weary of the growing acceptance of this newfound
legal theory. 42 The decision also caused significant consternation within
federal courts, spawning two distinct lines of cases that expanded the
scope of deepening insolvency and interpreted the Lafferty holding in dramatically different fashions. 43 One progeny of cases extended Lafferty's
reasoning to hold that deepening insolvency could be utilized as a theory
of damages to measure the harm caused by breaching a fiduciary duty or a
duty of care. 44 Another line of cases rejected deepening insolvency as a
behalf by the doctrine of in pari delicto. See Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 349 (rejecting
plaintiff's argument). The doctrine in pari delicto is "the equitable doctrine that a
court should not assist a participant in a wrongful act to profit from it. Traditionally... [t] he knowledge and conduct of corporate officials acting within the scope
of their duties generally is imputed to the corporation." See Willett, supra note 4, at
557-58 (defining in pari delicto). In the instant case, plaintiffs claim was barred
because the officers' and directors' misconduct would be imputed to the debtor.
See Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 350 (rejecting plaintiff's argument). But see Willett, supra
note 4, at 560 ("There is little doubt that the doctrine of in pari delicto is now in
retreat.").
41. See David Gordon, The Expansion of Deepening Insolvency Standing: Beyond
Trustees and Creditors' Committees, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEv.J. 221, 224-25 (2005) (concluding that Lafferty laid foundation for modern deepening insolvency jurisprudence); Harrell, supra note 4, at 154-57 (noting that Lafferty was "benchmark" case
recognizing deepening insolvency).
42. See, e.g., Maaren A. Choksi, Sink or Swim? A Case for Salvaging Deepening
Insolvency Theory, 7J. Bus. & SEC. L. 163, 170 (2007) (noting that "at a time when
the threat of large corporate bankruptcies (e.g., Enron) and resulting investor
harm was just crashing into the public consciousness[,]" the "infamous" Lafferty
decision "exploded into the mainstream .... "); Russell C. Silberglied, LTV and
Post-PetitionDeepening Insolvency: The Next Big Wave?, 25-Feb AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 1
(2006) ("Few theories in recent years have generated more ink-whether in
the form of pleadings, court decisions or academic debate-than 'deepening
insolvency.'").
43. For a discussion of Lafferty's progeny, see infra notes 44-77 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Fla. Dep't of Ins. v. Chase Bank of Tex. Nat'l Ass'n, 274 F.3d 924,
935 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding deepening insolvency may be used as theory of damages); Bookland of Me. v. Baker, Newman & Noyes, 271 F. Supp. 2d 324, 325 (D.
Me. 2003) (utilizing deepening insolvency as theory of damages); Tabas v. Greenleaf Ventures, Inc. (In re Flagship Healthcare Inc.), 269 B.R. 721, 727-28 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 2001) (broadening deepening insolvency to include its use as measure of
damages). But see Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey & Assoc., P.C. (In re CitX Corp.), 448
F.3d 672, 677-78 (3d Cir. 2006) (ruling that prior holding in Lafferty "should not be
interpreted to create a novel theory of damages for an independent cause of action like malpractice"); Heaton, supra note 2, at 480 ("Few courts seem to realize
that Lafferty did not endorse the idea that wrongfully-incurred unpayable debt, per
se, measures injury to a corporation."). For a complete discussion of CitX's rejec-
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measure of damages, but widened the spectrum of those conceivably liable
for deepening insolvency-concluding that stakeholders could hold both
corporate management and lenders liable. 45 What had begun as a rejection of the oft-cited proposition, that any act which extends the life of a
corporation must inherently be beneficial to it, was transformed into a
powerful tool by which creditors could recoup financial losses resulting
46
from insolvency.
1.

Deepening Insolvency as a Theory of Damages

The Lafferty decision sought to curb the fraudulent behavior of corporate insiders who intentionally extended the life of an insolvent corporation
for personal financial gain. 4 7 The first court to build on the analysis set
forth in Lafferty, however, considered the more controversial issues of
whether to extend deepening insolvency to negligent acts and whether to
apply it as a theory of damages. 48 In Tabas v. GreenleafVentures, Inc. (In re
Flagship Healthcare, Inc.), 49 a Florida bankruptcy court held that the negligent valuation of goodwill acquired by Flagship Healthcare, which contributed in large part to its subsequent insolvency, was sufficient to establish a
claim for deepening insolvency as a theory of damages.5 0 Relying on a
negligently prepared financial analysis, Flagship Healthcare incurred exortion of deepening insolvency as a measure of damages, see infra notes 91-97 and
accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., OHC Liquidation Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Oakwood Homes Corp.), 340 B.R. 540, 531 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (relying on Lafferty to
rule that deepening insolvency would be recognized under Delaware, New York
and North Carolina law as independent cause of action); Stanziale v. Pepper Hamilton LLP (In re Student Fin. Corp.), 335 B.R. 539, 548 (D. Del. 2005) (following
Lafferty and holding that deepening insolvency is independent cause of action); In
re LTV Steel Co., 333 B.R. 397, 422 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005) (upholding deepening insolvency as independent cause of action); Miller v. Dutil (In re Total Containment, Inc.), 335 B.R. 589, 619 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2005) (same); Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors v. Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Exide Techs., Inc.), 299
B.R. 732, 733 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (holding that Delaware law recognized deepening insolvency as valid cause of action). For a thorough discussion of the court's
holding in Exide, see infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Paul Rubin, Deepening Insolvency is Sinking Fast, THE BANKRUPTCY
STRATEGIST, 24 No. 2A, (Dec. 2006-Jan. 2007) ("Five years ago, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals opened the door to extensive litigation by holding, in [Lafferty]
that Pennsylvania law would recognize a cause of action for deepening
insolvency.").
47. For a complete discussion of the factual background and holding in Lafferty, see supra notes 28-41 and accompanying text.
48. See Flagship Healthcare, 269 B.R. at 726; Harrell, supra note 4, at 161-64
(stating that "[Flagship Healthcare] involves the expansion of insolvency based on
the negligent act of a third-party professional."). For an analysis of the issues
before the court in Flagship Healthcare, see infra notes 49-52 and accompanying
text.
49. 269 B.R. 721 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001).
50. See id. at 727-28 (affirming Lafferty's analysis that theory of deepening insolvency could be utilized as theory of damages). The court succinctly described
the situation in lay terms stating that:
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bitant amounts of additional debt to finance the acquisition of another
company and the execution of certain loan transactions. 5 1 The court
stated that, although not specifically pled as such, the additional debt incurred as a result of the defendant's negligence "may provide a measure of
52
damages recoverable by the Trustee."
The Flagship Healthcare ruling is significant in the development of
deepening insolvency jurisprudence for two reasons. 53 First, it began the
imprudent expansion of deepening insolvency to include negligent acts
committed by third parties. 5 4 The incorporation of negligence into the
doctrine worried many observers that subsequent courts might extend the
55
lowered standard to decisions effectuated by corporate management.
[T]he Debtor's situation was not like an individual who sits in the rain all
day and simply cannot get more wet. It is more akin to a boxer with one
black eye who, despite being injured, might still persevere and win the
fight. If that boxer (the debtor) winds up losing the fight and landing in
the hospital (bankruptcy court), a doctor (judge) might find that it was
the additional injuries (deepening insolvency) which put him there.
Id. at 724 n.4 (finding facts sufficient to establish claim for deepening insolvency).
51. See id. at 725 (detailing terms of acquisition, term loan agreement and
revolving credit facility executed in reliance on financial analysis). The plaintiff
alleged that the financial advisor owed a duty of due professional care to the creditor and that it had breached this duty. See id. (claiming negligence in preparation
of financial analysis that endorsed goodwill valuation). The plaintiff further alleged "that 'the Greenleaf valuation was materially unreliable and incorrect' and
'materially overstated the value of Flagship's goodwill.'" See id. (noting several specific errors or omissions in valuation process). The court held that the negligent
acts were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of deepening insolvency established
in Lafferty. See id. at 728 ("The financial hardships which possibly resulted from the
increased insolvency were not necessarily forthcoming, and if it can be proven that
they were a result of the increased insolvency, liability may be found.").
52. Id. (utilizing deepening insolvency as measure of damages as opposed to
cause of action). But see infra notes 92-97 (discussing inherent flaws in holding that
deepening insolvency is applied correctly as theory of damages).
53. For a discussion of FlagshipHealthcare'simportant role in the development
of deepening insolvency jurisprudence, see infra notes 54-59 and accompanying
text.
54. See Harrell, supra note 4, at 164 (discussing facts of Flagship Healthcareby
noting that case involves deepening insolvency claim based on negligent act of
third-party professional). The Ninth Circuit has improvidently drawn on the reasoning set forth in Flagship Healthcareand has extended deepening insolvency to
negligent acts. See Smith v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 421 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir.
2005) (recognizing deepening insolvency for unintentionally misrepresenting
firm's insolvency). For a detailed analysis of FlagshipHealthcare's misguided extension of deepening insolvency to include negligent acts, see supra notes 48-52 and
accompanying text.
55. See Harrell, supra note 4, at 167-68 (sounding concern that "the deepening insolvency theory could extend to negligently informed decisions of officers
and directors, thereby negating the business judgment presumption in the realm
of potential insolvency"). One commentator has noted that allowing trustees to
assert deepening insolvency claims based solely on negligence may:
provide a cause of action in tort against officers and directors, supplanting a breach of fiduciary duty claim .... [A] cause of action in tort
against officers and directors that circumvents the business judgment rule
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This distinction is crucial because it would allow shareholders to circumvent the business judgment rule and the penumbra of protection the rule
affords corporate executives who act in good faith in accordance with
56
their fiduciary duties.
Second, FlagshipHealthcarewas one of the first decisions to treat deepening insolvency as a measure of damages resulting from wrongfully incurred debt rather than as an independent cause of action.5 7 The use of
deepening insolvency as a theory of damages is problematic because it
does not reflect an accurate measure of harm to the corporation resulting
from the defendant's acts and is "inconsistent with the traditional understanding ... of corporate injury."58 These two issues, highlighted in the
may potentially create a decline in the market for corporate directors,
which in turn would have a damaging impact on corporate governance
and possibly the economy as a whole.
Id. (explaining risk that deepening insolvency tort poses to corporate governance).
56. See Harrell, supra note 4, at 151-54 (discussing protection from liability
that business judgment rule affords corporation's executives and directors). The
business judgment rule allows corporate executives to make tactical business decisions in the best interest of their company without fear that they will be liable if
their decisions fail to maximize value, or if in the worst instance, they result in
insolvency. See id. at 151-54 (discussing protection from liability that business judgment rule affords corporations' executives). Specifically, the business judgment
rule provides:
[I]n making business decisions not involving direct self-interest or self
dealing, corporate directors act on an informed basis, in good faith, and
in the honest belief that their actions are in the corporation's best interest. The rule shields directors and officers from liability for unprofitable
or harmful corporate transactions if the transaction were made in good
faith, with due care, and within the directors' or officers authority.
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 212 (8th ed. 2004).
57. See Heaton, supra note 2, at 480-81 (arguing FlagshipHealthcaremistakenly
interpreted Lafferty's holding). One commentator has stated that "[w]ithout saying so directly, the Lafferty court produced an opinion that has been read incorrectly to endorse wrongfully-incurred unpayable debt as a measure of injury to a
corporation." See id. (discussing varying misinterpretations of Lafferty ruling).
58. See Bernstein & Malloy, supra note 6, at 415 n.43 (detailing shortcomings
of deepening insolvency as theory of damages). One commentator has further
noted the inconsistencies within the theory, stating that:
One may legitimately question whether deepening insolvency is a proper
measure of damages in these cases. Why not instead measure the damages . . . by actually quantifying the harm suffered as a result of actions
taken by the defendant? Moreover, why should the damage calculation
differ between (1) a company that is insolvent and then rendered more
insolvent by wrongful conduct, and (2) a company that begins solvent but
is rendered insolvent by the same conduct? Yet, deepening insolvency
seems to imply a different measure of damages in the case when the company begins insolvent and then is rendered more insolvent. Because of
these and similar questions, there will continue to be doubt about the
validity of deepening insolvency as a measure of damages.
Id. (noting flaws in asserting deepening insolvency as theory of damages); see also
Heaton, supra note 2, at 500 (concluding that use of deepening insolvency as theory of damages is unsupported in financial economic theory).
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Flagship Healthcare decision, have plagued the muddled cloud of deepen59
ing insolvency jurisprudence since its inception.
2.

Deepening Insolvency as an Independent Cause of Action

A different progeny of cases, following directly in Lafferty's footsteps,
further expanded deepening insolvency as a distinct and separate action
to include lenders as defendants. 60 In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Suisse First Boston (In re Exide Technologies, Inc.), 6 1 a bankruptcy court for
the District of Delaware held that when lenders issued additional debt as a
means of granting themselves security interests in the debtor's corporation, they caused the corporation to operate at "ever increasing levels of
insolvency," thus giving the creditors standing to assert a claim of deepening insolvency against the lenders.6 2 The bankruptcy court acknowledged
59. See Willett, supra note 4, at 561-64 (discussing number of opinions within
deepening insolvency jurisprudence over last twenty-five years that have struggled
to determine whether deepening insolvency is independent cause of action or
measure of damages). Certain courts have upheld deepening insolvency as a measure of damages. See Allard v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 924 F. Supp. 488, 494
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (indicating deepening insolvency is theory of damages); Hannover
Corp. of Am. v. Beckner, 211 B.R. 849, 854 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1997) (recognizing
deepening insolvency as method of calculating corporation's damages that includes amount of indebtedness incurred from prolonging life of insolvent business). Other courts have repudiated deepening insolvency as a theory of damages.
See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of VarTec Telecom, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Fin. Coop. (In re VarTec Telecom, Inc.), 335 B.R. 631, 644 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2005) (refusing to recognize deepening insolvency as theory of damages or independent cause of action); Coroles v. Sabey, 79 P.3d 974, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 2003)
(rejecting deepening insolvency as theory of damages).
60. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Credit Suisse First Boston
(In re Exide Techs., Inc.), 299 B.R. 732, 752 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (finding actionable claim for deepening insolvency against defendant lenders); see also Willett,
supra note 4, at 549 (noting that "a Delaware court moved the theory to its next
step, ruling that a plaintiff stated a claim against a lender on the theory that the
lender's prepetition loan helped deepen the insolvency of a Chapter Eleven
debtor").
61. 299 B.R. 732 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
62. See id. at 752 (upholding deepening insolvency as independent cause of
action). In 1997, Exide borrowed large sums of money from Credit Suisse First
Boston. See id. at 736 (stating bank provided $650 million credit facility and
loaned another $250 million for acquisition). Three years later Exide borrowed
additional money to finance the acquisition of GNP Dunlop; however, in exchange
for this extension of credit, Exide granted First Boston additional collateral and
guarantees. See id. (same). The effect of the transaction "was to increase significantly the Pre-Petition Banks' control over the Exide Group." See id. (stating facts
that led to quasi-transfer of control). The plaintiff-creditors alleged that First Boston effectively forced Exide to purchase GNP Dunlop so that First Boston would be
able to obtain control over the entity and thereby force Exide to operate at increasing levels of insolvency. See id. at 751 (stating plaintiff's argument for claim of
deepening insolvency). The syndicate argued that insofar as the Delaware Supreme Court had not recognized a claim for deepening insolvency, the bankruptcy
court should dismiss the action for failure to state a claim. See id. (asserting that
"deepening insolvency action is not recognized under Delaware law"). The bankruptcy court disagreed and recognized the tort of deepening insolvency under Del-
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that neither the Delaware Supreme Court nor other intermediate courts
had addressed whether litigants could assert a tort claim for deepening
insolvency under that state's laws. 63 Nevertheless, the court utilized the
analysis set forth in Lafferty and held that Delaware law would recognize a
claim for deepening insolvency if there has been "damage to corporate
64
property."
Many practitioners and commentators characterized the Exide rule as
ajudicial escalation of the tort of deepening insolvency because it enabled
creditors to sue lenders, as opposed to corporate management, for the
issuance of additional debt.6 5 This variation and expansion of the Lafferty
holding caught the ire of many corporate insiders due to the large concentration of companies incorporated in Delaware and because of the constraints that the decision placed on lenders extending insolvent
66
corporations additional credit.
D.

The Push Back: Judicial Backlash Against Deepening Insolvency

The speed with which deepening insolvency had rapidly evolved into
both an independent cause of action and a theory of damages brought the
bankruptcy tort to the forefront of legal discourse. 67 The legal and economic theories that form its basis, however, began to face increasing skepaware law. See id. at 752 ("The tort of deepening insolvency has been pled
sufficiently by the Plaintiffs."); see also Rubin, supra note 40, at 50 (explaining facts
of Exide). Delaware state courts have subsequently diverged from Exide's conclusions, holding that Delaware law does not recognize the tort of deepening insolvency. See Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 207
(Del. Ch. 2006) (rejecting premise that Delaware recognizes deepening insolvency
claims).
63. See Exide, 299 B.R. at 751 ("The Supreme Court of Delaware has not spoken on the tort of deepening insolvency. For this reason, I must predict how the
Delaware Supreme Court would rule on the claim if such claim was presented to
it.").

64. See id. at 751-52 (finding for plaintiffs). The court held that "based on the
Third Circuit's decision in Lafferty and the Delaware courts' policy of providing a
remedy for an injury . . . [the] Delaware Supreme Court would recognize a claim
for deepening insolvency when there has been damage to corporate property." Id.
at 752. The court reasoned that all of the elements of the Lafferty test had been
met and, therefore, it was likely that the Delaware Supreme Court would, if given
the opportunity, affirm the tort of deepening insolvency as a separate and distinct
cause of action. See id. (ruling that deepening insolvency was actionable under
Delaware law).
65. For a discussion on the court's expansion of deepening insolvency to include lenders as defendants in deepening insolvency causes of action, see supra
notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Landers, Deepening Insolvency Comes of Age, N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 5. 2006, at 4 ("Many U.S. corporations are venued in Delaware, and a significant number of cases raising questions of deepening insolvency have involved Delaware corporations.")
67. See, e.g., James M. Peck, David M. Jillman & Elizabeth L. Rose, "Deepening
Insolvency ": Litigation Risks for Lenders and Directors When Out-OfCourt Restructuring
Efforts Fail, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 293, 293 (2004) (concluding that deepening insolvency is "unfortunate and troubling for lenders, directors, and advisors involved in
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ticism by courts across the country. 68 In Kittay v. Atlantic Bank of New York
(In re Global Service Group, LLC), 6 9 a bankruptcy court for the Southern
District of New York refused to recognize deepening insolvency as either
an independent cause of action or a theory of damages.7 0 The court rejected a trustee's argument that a lender knew or should have known
Global Service Group was insolvent, and that by lending it additional sums
of money in light of this knowledge, the lender induced other creditors to
follow suit.71 The trustee asserted that the extension of this credit to
Global served to "prolong its corporate existence" and increased the corporation's debt.7 2 The court held, however, that absent allegations the
lender acted in bad faith or in a fraudulent manner, lending an insolvent
73
corporation may be "bad banking," but it is not an actionable tort.
The Global Service Group decision curbed the expansion of deepening
insolvency claims by asserting that the prolongation of a corporate entity
through the incurrence of additional debt will not, by itself, give rise to
actionable harm.7 4 The court held that, in order to state a claim, the
plaintiff "must show that the defendant prolonged the company's life in
breach of a separate duty, or committed an actionable tort that contributed to the continued operation of a corporation and its increased
debt."75 The court also upheld the applicability of the business judgment
pre-bankruptcy restructurings"); Richmond et al., supra note 4, at 131 (illustrating
that deepening insolvency is increasingly popular cause of action).
68. See, e.g., Bondi v. Citigroup, Inc., No. BER-L-10902-04, 2005 WL 975856, at
*21 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 28, 2005) (rejecting deepening insolvency as
independent cause of action); Coroles v. Sabey, 79 P.3d 974, 983 (Utah Ct. App.
2003) ("Although deepening insolvency might harm a corporation's shareholders,
it does not, without more, harm the corporation itself."); William Bates III, Deepening Insolvency: Into the Void, 24-Mar Am. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 1, 60-62 (discussing limitations and flaws in deepening insolvency); Heaton, supra note 2, at 500 (arguing
that deepening insolvency is "unsupported in financial economics and inconsistent
with the traditional understanding and economic functions of corporate injury");
Willett, supra note 4, at 574-75 (disputing notion that deepening insolvency can
cause harm to corporate entity).
69. 316 B.R. 451 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).
70. See id. at 458 (rejecting deepening insolvency as both independent tort
and theory of damages). One commentator has noted that the Global Service Group
decision "injected much-needed sense into the discussion by ruling that 'deepening insolvency' is not a cause of action at all." See Willett, supra note 4, at 551
(discussing impact of Global Service Group's rejection of deepening insolvency).
71. See Global Serv. Group, 316 B.R. at 459 (rejecting argument that lender induced other creditors to loan money to Global Service Group).
72. See id. at 455-56 (alleging lender deepened Global Service Group's
insolvency).
73. See id. at 459 ("A third party is not prohibited from extending credit to an
insolvent entity; if it was, most companies in financial distress would be forced to
liquidate.").
74. See id. (rejecting deepening insolvency claims without breach of separate
duty).
75. Id. at 458 (holding that deepening insolvency claims require breach of
independent duty to corporation that results in deepening corporation's insolvency); see also John Weitnauer, Will "DeepeningInsolvency" Succeed as a New Theory
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rule within the zone of insolvency, concluding that a director's negligent
decision to continue to operate an insolvent business would not subject
the director to liability. 76 Global Service Group's direct repudiation of Lafferty and its progeny began a growing trend to limit the widening reach of
77
deepening insolvency.
III.

THE THIRD CIRCUIT REINS IN DEEPENING INSOLVENCY IN CITX

A.

Taking Aim at Lafferty

In the five short years following the Lafferty decision, the tort of deepening insolvency became a judicial juggernaut spreading its tentacles of
liability into the deep pockets of everyone conceivably liable for deepen78
Unhinged from rational judicial coning a corporation's insolvency.
straints, stakeholders utilized the tort to sue a corporation's auditors,
lawyers, underwriters and even lenders who provided additional credit to
79
Largely as a reaction to the various misinterpretadistressed entities.
tions of Lafferty, the Third Circuit in CitX took aim at deepening insolvency and successfully limited its reach in three ways: (1) the court held
that deepening insolvency may not be invoked as a theory of damages to
8 0
(2) the court ruled that a deepensupport a malpractice cause of action;
ing insolvency claim cannot be sustained solely on an allegation of negli8
gent conduct; ' and (3) the court ruled that Lafferty's precedential value
8 2
was limited to courts within Pennsylvania.

Under Lender Liability?, 59 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 430, 430-32 (2005) (detailing
Global Service Group's rejection of deepening insolvency as independent cause of
action and theory of damages).
76. See Global Serv. Group, 316 B.R. at 461 ("To overcome the business judgment rule, a complaint must contain specific allegations that the fiduciary acted in
bad faith or with fraudulent intent."). For a complete discussion of the protection
the business judgment rule affords corporate management, see supra note 56, and
infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
77. For a discussion of cases that began to limit deepening insolvency, see
infra notes 124-32 and accompanying text.
78. For a discussion of the manner by which deepening insolvency was expanded by two distinct lines of cases, see supra notes 42-66 and accompanying text.
79. For a complete discussion of the manner by which deepening insolvency
expanded to various defendants, see supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
80. See Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey & Assoc., P.C. (In re CitX Corp.), 448 F.3d
672, 677-78, 680 n.11, 681 (3d Cir. 2006) (rejecting deepening insolvency as theory
of damages for malpractice suits); see also Jo Ann Brighton, Deepening the Blows
Against Insolvency? The Third Circuit's CitX Opinion and Post-CitX Opinions, 25-Sep
Am. BANKR. INST. J. 24, 24-25 (2006) ("CitX has dealt quite a blow to deepening
insolvency."). For a complete discussion the court's decision to reject deepening
insolvency as a theory of damages, see infra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
81. See CitX, 448 F.3d at 681 ("[W]e hold that a claim of negligence cannot
sustain a deepening-insolvency cause of action."). For further discussion on the
court's holding regarding negligence, see infra notes 98-102 and accompanying
text.
82. See CitX, 448 F.3d at 680 n.ll ("[N]othing we said in Lafferty compels any
extension of the doctrine beyond Pennsylvania."). For further discussion on the
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FactualBackground

CitX Corporation, a former Internet company, utilized its prepared
financial statements to attract inventors as part of an illegal "Ponzi
scheme." 83 The Florida Attorney General terminated the operations of
CitX's most profitable customer, Professional Resources Systems Interna84
tional (PRSI), because it was operating as a "fraudulent enterprise."
PRSI was CitX's only significant client, and at the time PRSI ceased operating, it owed CitX $2.4 million. 85 CitX continued to show the account receivable as an asset, which allowed CitX to appear solvent. 86 In reality, had
CitX reflected the loss of the receivable, its liabilities would have exceeded
its assets. 8 7 By continuing to show the receivable, CitX was able to sell

additional equity securities for more than $1 million. 8 Soon thereafter,
CitX filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and the trustee in bankruptcy sued
the corporation's accounting firm, Detweiler, Hershey & Associates, alleging that the negligently prepared financial information enabled CitX to
secure $1 million in additional equity, which allowed CitX to continue
operating and incurring debt. 89 The trustee stated that this additional equity "dramatically deepened the insolvency of CitX, and wrongfully expanded the debt of CitX and waste of its illegally raised capital." 90
C.

Third Circuit Rejects Deepening Insolvency as a Theory of Damages

A three judge panel (including one of the judges who issued the Laf-

ferty ruling) held in CitX that deepening insolvency may not be invoked as
court's refusal to extend Lafferty beyond Pennsylvania, see infra notes 103-05 and

accompanying text.
83. See CitX, 448 F.3d at 674-675 (stating factual background). For a definition of a "Ponzi scheme," see supra note 30.
84. See id. (stating factual background). CitXjoined with PRSI to create an
internet shopping mall for home-based merchants that paid a fee to be featured
online. See id. (same). PRSI illegally scammed close to $18,000,000 from its clients, and CitX received approximately $700,000 of this money. See id. (same).
85. See id. at 674 (noting CitX's large sum of indebtedness).
86. See id. ("In CitX's compiled financials, this was all that was keeping the
company theoretically in the black.").
87. See id. (describing CitX's financial background).
88. See id. (noting method by which CitX increased its insolvency).
89. See id. at 675-76 (describing factual background). The complaint contained four separate causes of action: malpractice, deepening insolvency, breach of
fiduciary duty and negligent misrepresentation. See id. (detailing complaint).
90. See id. at 677-78 (arguing that infusion of equity allowed CitX to continue
operating while management incurred "millions more in debt"). Additionally, the
trustee argued that the accounting firm overlooked several warning signs that
should have alerted it to CitX's impending financial problems. See id. at 675 (noting plaintiff's allegations). For example, CitX's own bookkeeper had not completed high school, and the only asset purportedly keeping CitX solvent was an
account receivable from a corporation that the Attorney General had shut down
because of fraud. See id. at 675 (noting plaintiffs allegations).
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a theory of damages to support an independent cause of action.9 1 In the
immediate malpractice suit, the trustee sought to establish the harm done
to CitX by asserting deepening insolvency as a theory of damages. 92 The
court utilized its ruling in CitX to further illuminate Lafferty and noted
that, although it had described deepening insolvency as a "theory of injury," it had not held that deepening insolvency was a valid theory of damages for an independent cause of action. 9 3 The court ruled that prior
statements in Lafferty "were in the context of a deepening-insolvency cause
of action" and "should not be interpreted to create a novel theory of damages for an independent cause of action . .

.94

Additionally, the court in CitX held that summary judgment was appropriate because the trustee did not establish the requisite harm to the
corporation.9 5 Even assuming that Detweiler's negligently prepared financial statements enabled CitX to procure an additional $1 million in capital
investments, the court ruled that the action did not "deepen CitX's insolvency, but rather, it did the opposite." 9 6 Using legal reasoning that seemingly turned deepening insolvency on its head, the court declared that any
increase in insolvency resulting from the debt incurred after equity was
raised was the result of CitX's management, not the accountants, and
therefore Detweiler could not be held liable for deepening the corpora97
tion's insolvency.
91. See id. at 677 (rejecting deepening insolvency as theory of damages); see
also Brighton, supra note 80, at 24 (noting that same judge presided over CitX and
Lafferty opinions).
92. See CitX, 448 F.3d at 677 (stating that plaintiff's complaint "allege [d] harm
to it in the form of 'deepening insolvency"').
93. See id. (clarifying Lafferty holding and limiting its scope). The court recognized that its prior holding in Lafferty was responsible for some of the confusion
regarding whether deepening insolvency is a "type of injury," a "theory of injury"
and/or an "independent cause of action." See id. (discussing ambiguous language
of Lafferty).
94. See id. at 677 (rejecting deepening insolvency as theory of damages for
malpractice suit). Although the holding rejects deepening insolvency as a theory
of damages solely for claims based on negligence, the court stated in dicta that its
decision was not meant to imply that deepening insolvency was a theory of damages for other claims either. See id. at 677 n.8 ("By this we do not mean to imply
that deepening insolvency would be a valid theory of damages for any other cause
of action, such as fraud, and Lafferty did not so hold.").
95. See id. at 677 ("Seitz did not provide sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find harm.").
96. See id. at 677 (holding that CitX's insolvency "decreased rather than deepened" because equity investment increased company assets with no corresponding
increase in liabilities).
97. See id. at 678 (rejecting plaintiff's argument). Discussing the underlying
theories behind deepening insolvency, the court stated "[t]he deepening of a
firm's insolvency is not an independent form of corporate damage. Where an independent cause of action gives a firm a remedy for ... the decrease in fair asset
value[,] ... then the firm may recover, without reference to the impact upon the
solvency calculation." See id. (citing Willett, supra note 4, at 575) (questioning
whether deepening insolvency is harmful to corporate entities).
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Third Circuit Rejects Negligence as a Basis for Deepening Insolvency Claims

The Third Circuit proceeded in CitX to further circumscribe the unintended impact of Lafferty by holding that allegations based solely on neg-

ligence are insufficient to support a claim of deepening insolvency.98 The
trustee's allegations centered on the claim that Detweiler missed several
obvious discrepancies that should have alerted the firm to the errors in the
financial statements. 99 As a result of Detweiler's negligently prepared financial statements, the trustee asserted that CitX was able to obtain $1
million in capital investments thus deepening CitX's insolvency.' 0 0 The
court rejected this argument, stating that "a claim of negligence cannot
sustain a deepening-insolvency cause of action." 10 1 The court refused to
expand Lafferty beyond its exact wording, holding that claims for deepening insolvency may only arise from the "fraudulent expansion of corporate
1 02
debt and prolongation of corporate life."
E.

Limiting Lafferty's Precedential Value

The CitX decision further curtailed the expansion of deepening insolvency by explicitly limiting Lafferty's value as precedent to matters governed by Pennsylvania law. 10 3 The court cautioned that "[a] lthough some
courts in this Circuit have extended Lafferty's reasoning to other states...
nothing we said in Lafferty compels any extension of the doctrine beyond
Pennsylvania."1 0 4 The Third Circuit went so far as to admonish other
courts within the circuit for extending deepening insolvency beyond its
proscribed limitations and relying on Lafferty to find an independent cause
of action for deepening insolvency under Delaware and New York law. 10 5
IV.

CITX's EFFECT ON DEEPENING INSOLVENCY JURISPRUDENCE
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The CitX decision is consistent with the expanding body of law that
has begun to limit the much-maligned Lafferty decision and systematically
98. See id. at 680 (rejecting negligence as basis for deepening insolvency
claims).
99. See id. (discussing trustees allegations).
100. See id. ("Without fraud, Seitz must fall back on his allegation that Detweiler negligently deepened CitX's insolvency, [and] we must decide whether an
allegation of negligence can support a claim of deepening insolvency.").
101. See id. at 681-82 (holding negligence insufficient to establish claim for

deepening insolvency).
102. See id. at 680-81 ("We know no reason to extend the scope of deepening

insolvency beyond Lafferty's limited holding. To that end, we hold that a claim of
negligence cannot sustain a deepening insolvency cause of action.").
103. See id. at 680 (rejecting extension of Lafferty beyond Pennsylvania).
104. See id. at 680 n.11 (limiting Lafferty's holding to Pennsylvania).
105. See id. (describing ruling in Oakwood Homes, which held that deepening
insolvency is cognizable cause of action under law of New York, Delaware and
North Carolina). For a complete discussion of the facts of Oakwood Homes, see infra
notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
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dismantle the tort of deepening insolvency.1 0 6 It is nevertheless significant, in its own right, to the development of deepening insolvency within
the Third Circuit and more broadly to federal deepening insolvency jurisprudence in three ways.10 7 First, by holding that deepening insolvency
causes of action must be predicated on fraud, the CitX decision creates
heightened procedural standards for plaintiffs to overcome when seeking
to bring actions based on deepening insolvency.' 0 8 Additionally, in refusing to recognize negligence as a basis for deepening insolvency, the decision provides assurance to corporate executives that good faith efforts to
salvage distressed entities will not result in liability should the corporation
reach insolvency.' 0 9 Lastly, by rejecting deepening insolvency as a theory
of damages and expressly limiting the Lafferty holding to matters governed
by Pennsylvania law, the CitX decision signals the Third Circuit's growing
reservations concerning deepening insolvency to lower courts in Pennsylvania and elsewhere within the Circuit. 110
106. See Bondi v. Bank of Am. Corp. (In re Parmalat), 383 F. Supp. 2d 587, 602
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (rejecting deepening insolvency under North Carolina law as duplicative of remedies for breach of fiduciary duty). The court declined "the invitation to recognize a novel tort duty giving rise to a novel cause of action under
North Carolina law. North Carolina already imposes on every person a duty not to
aid and abet a breach of fiduciary duty by another." Id. (refusing to recognize
deepening insolvency); Alberts v. Tuft (In re Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. Corp.), 333
B.R. 506, 517 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2005) ("The District of Columbia courts have not yet
recognized a cause of action for deepening insolvency, and this court sees no reason why they should."). The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia also
noted the duplicative nature of deepening insolvency: "If officers and directors can
be shown to have breached their fiduciary duties by deepening a corporation's
insolvency, and the resulting injury to the corporation is cognizable, that injury is
compensable on a claim for breach of fiduciary duty." See id. (quoting Bondi v.
Bank of Am. Corp. (In re Parmalat), 383 F. Supp. 2d 587, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 2005))
(holding that breach of fiduciary claims are sufficient to remedy harm done to
corporation through deepening insolvency); accord Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors of VarTec Telecom, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Fin. Coop. (In re VarTec Telecom,
Inc.), 335 B.R. 631, 644 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) ("[T]he Court finds that the
Texas Supreme Court would not adopt 'deepening insolvency' as a separate tort,
because the injury caused by the deepening of a corporation's insolvency is substantially duplicated by torts already established in Texas."); Kittay v. Ad. Bank of
N.Y. (In re Global Serv. Group, LLC), 316 B.R. 451, 458-59 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(rejecting deepening insolvency as independent cause action and theory of damages). For a discussion of the Global Service Group ruling, see supra notes 69-77 and
accompanying text.
107. For a complete discussion of the significance of CitXon deepening insolvency jurisprudence, see infra notes 108-32 and accompanying text.
108. See CitX, 448 F.3d at 680 (3d Cir. 2006) (rejecting negligence as basis for
deepening insolvency claims). For a discussion of the heightened procedural standards that the fraud requirement creates for deepening insolvency, see infra notes
111-17 accompanying text.
109. For a complete discussion of CitXs impact on corporate governance, see
infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
110. See CitX, 448 F.3d at 677 (rejecting deepening insolvency as theory of
damages). For a discussion on the expanding body of case law that has seized on
CitXs curtailment of deepening insolvency, see infra notes 124-32 and accompanying text.
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Fraud: An Additional Barrier in Asserting Deepening Insolvency Claims

The CitX decision held that absent fraud, tort liability should not arise
from efforts to extend the life of a corporation, even if those efforts result
in the increased indebtedness of the enterprise."'I By predicating deepening insolvency on fraudulent acts rather than mere negligence, CitX
makes it much more difficult for a plaintiff to assert a claim for deepening
insolvency.11 2 Under this heightened standard, a plaintiff seemingly must
prove the stringent fraud requirements in addition to the requisite damage to corporate property to successfully assert a claim for deepening
13
insolvency. 1
Although courts have different requirements for fraud claims, the
CitX court approvingly cited the United States Bankruptcy Court's Oakwood Homes interpretation of what constituted fraud within the confines of
Lafferty. 114 The Oakwood Homes ruling held that in order to prove fraud, a
plaintiff must prove "a representation of material fact, falsity, scienter, reliance, and injury." 1 1 5 Should a plaintiff bring a deepening insolvency suit
within a state that recognizes the tort as an independent cause of action,
the plaintiff would have to prove all five elements of fraud, and presumably also prove "an injury to the debtor's corporate property from the
fraudulent expansion of corporate debt and prolongation of corporate
life." 116 The extra hurdles CitXadded to the pleading process have effec111. See CitX, 448 F.3d at 680 (rejecting negligence as basis for deepening
insolvency claims in favor of standard that requires intentional action).
112. SeeJo Ann Brighton, The Trenwick Decision-TheDeath Knell for Deepening
Insolvency? "Zone of Insolvency" Case Law Reigned In? Delaware State Court Says "No
Action "for Deepening Insolvency in Delaware, but .. ,25-Oct Am.BANK. INST. J. 32, 33,
77-78 (2006) (explaining that added procedural barriers in asserting deepening
insolvency cause of action have increased difficulty with which claim is pled).
113. See id. at 78 ("Even if the hurdle of getting recognition of a state law
cause of action for deepening insolvency is cleared, the recent decisions of CitX
and Oakwood Homes appear to require allegations of fraud in order to be
successful.").
114. See CitX, 448 F.3d at 681 (citing Oakwood Homes as correct interpretation
of fraud requirements). In Oakwood Homes, the court found that the plaintiffs
allegations-specifically, that the debtor relied on lenders' misrepresentations
about the solvency of a loan securitization program-were sufficient to prove fraud
and support an action for deepening insolvency. See OHC Liquidation Trust v.
Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Oakwood Homes Corp.), 340 B.R. 510, 514
(Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (stating factual background).
115. See Oakwood Homes, 340 B.R. at 534 (citing Vermeer Owners, Inc. v. Guterman, 585 N.E.2d 377, 378 (N.Y. 1991)) (noting five elements of fraud).
116. See id. at 534-35 (discussing appropriateness of application of fraud to
deepening insolvency); see also Brighton, supra note 80, at 77-78 (indicating added
requirements of deepening insolvency claims). One commentator has questioned
the continuing utility of deepening insolvency claims and has stated that "it appears that a plaintiff asserting deepening insolvency as a cause of action must
prove (1) fraud (with all five subparts), (2) that the fraud caused the expansion of
corporate debt and (3) that the fraud also caused the prolongation of the corporations (pre-bankruptcy) life." Id. at 78 (illustrating challenges of asserting claims
for deepening insolvency).
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tively made it more difficult to assert a deepening insolvency cause of action than a fraud claim, which will undoubtedly result in the assertion of
17
far fewer deepening insolvency causes of action.'
B.

Wide-Reaching Effects in the Board Room

Beyond the additional procedural requirements that CitX places on
deepening insolvency claims, the underlying holding in CitX reflects an
acute understanding of the perils associated with the expansion of deepening insolvency to negligent acts. 1 8 By declining to extend deepening
insolvency to mere negligence, the CitX court has enabled a board of directors to make reasonable business decisions on behalf of corporations
with the assurance that decisions made in good faith will be shielded from
liability by the business judgment rule." 9
117. See Brighton, supra note 80, at 68 (detailing added procedure plaintiffs
face when asserting deepening insolvency claims instead of fraud claims). One
commentator noted that "[t]he logical conclusion would be that plaintiffs would
prefer not to take on these additional hurdles; therefore[,] deepening insolvency
may not be included in complaints as an additional allegation with the same frequency in which it had been seen in the past few years." See id. (noting effects that
CitX will likely have on number of deepening insolvency actions); see also Andre
Tenzer, Third CircuitHolds That Negligent Conduct Is Not a Basisfor a Claim of Deepening Insolvency and Cautions Against a Broad Readingof Precedent Recognizing the Theory,

PRA"r'S J. OF BANKR. L. 244 (Aug.-Sept. 2006), available at http://www.shearman.
com/files/Publication/aa356955-1 f77-4fa5-b3ae-3505de0a86e7/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/6f02e3d0-b29d-419e-a2bd-369e2d687670/BR_082006.pdf
("Perhaps the greatest beneficiaries of CitX will be outside professional advisors to
bankrupt companies, against whom it will be more difficult to prove intentional
misconduct and complicity in a fraud than presumably negligence or
malpractice.").
118. See Harrell, supra note 4, at 175-76 (noting "slippery slope associated with
burdening corporate directors with ... potential liability"); accord Corporate Aviation Concepts, Inc. v. Multi-Serv. Aviation Corp., No. Civ.A. 03-3020, 2004 WL
1900001, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2004) (same); Oakwood Homes, 340 B.R. at 512
(upholding business judgment rule and holding that only fraudulent activities are
sufficient to establish deepening insolvency claim). One commentator elaborated
that extending deepening insolvency to claims of negligence "could provide a
cause of action distinct from a breach of fiduciary duty claim, [and] officers and
directors would be unable to rely on the protection of the business judgment rule."
See Harrell, supra note 4, at 153 (detailing problems associated with extending
deepening insolvency to negligent acts). But see Smith v. Arthur Andersen LLP,
421 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2005) (ruling that deepening insolvency exists "when
...the defendants 'misrepresent (not necessarily intentionally) the firm's financial
condition to its outside directors and investors."').
119. See Brian E. Greer, Fiduciary Duties When the Corporation is in the Zone of
Insolvency, 25-Nov AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26, 57 (2006) ("Application of the business
judgment rule will afford directors of troubled corporations the comfort to pursue
value-maximizing strategies for the corporate enterprise as a whole, even if such a
strategy includes the incurrence of additional debt obligations."); Rapisardi, supra
note 1, at 1 ("The Third Circuit's ruling in CitXshould afford directors of insolvent
corporations more assurance that they will not be exposed to liability for deepening insolvency as long as they do not intentionally commit fraud or some other
wrong.").
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If the court in CitXupheld a negligence standard for deepening insolvency claims, it may have produced a de facto duty to liquidate in the face
of insolvency. 120 Providing incentives for directors to immediately liquidate upon reaching insolvency rather than attempt to resuscitate corporations in an effort to maximize "long-term wealth creating capacity"
contravenes public policy and lengthy judicial precedent. 121 Additionally,
a contrary decision may have discouraged qualified members of the business community from accepting positions as directors out of fear of personal liability. 12 2 Ultimately, by rejecting negligence as a basis for
deepening insolvency, the CitX court upheld the sensible penumbra of
protection that the business judgment rule provides to corporate directors
who act in good faith, with due care and in compliance with their fiduciary

duties.

12 3

C.

Impact on Lower Courts

The Third Circuit decision in CitX represents one of the only appellate courts that, in the wake of the deepening insolvency hysteria, have
begun to add structure to the fractured nature of deepening insolvency
jurisprudence. 1 24 The CitX decision, which openly questioned lower
courts' decisions to extend deepening insolvency beyond Pennsylvania
and rejected deepening insolvency as a measure of damages, signified the
Third Circuit's growing reluctance to recognize deepening insolvency
claims.1 25 Against this backdrop, several lower courts have, in rapid suc120. See, e.g., Greer, supra note 119, at 58 (concluding that deepening insolvency has "constrained boards of corporations in the zone of insolvency from pursuing value-maximizing strategies for the corporation, which would benefit
stockholders as well as creditors").
121. See Kittay v. Ad. Bank of N.Y. (In re Global Serv. Group, LLC), 316 B.R.
451, 460 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) (ruling that "[t]he fiduciaries of an insolvent business might well conclude that the company should continue to operate in order to
maximize" its value). The court held that "there is no absolute duty under American law to shut down and liquidate an insolvent corporation. The fiduciaries may,
consistent with the business judgment rule, continue to operate the corporation's
business." Id. (explaining holding that insolvent corporation, to maximize value to
stakeholders, may continue to operate and not simply liquidate).
122. See Harrell, supra note 4, at 152 ("[I]f courts extend the deepening insolvency theory to include negligent decisions in the face of insolvency, thereby ignoring the business judgment presumption, the best and brightest will likely
decline these positions due to the increased potential for personal liability.").
123. See Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey & Assoc., P.C. (In reCitX Corp.), 448 F.3d
672, 681 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that "a claim of negligence cannot sustain a deepening-insolvency cause of action"). For a complete discussion of the court's holding in CitX, see supra notes 78-105 and accompanying text.
124. See CitX, 448 F.3d at 677-78, 680-81 (rejecting deepening insolvency
claims based on negligence and limiting Lafferty's precedential value to courts
within Pennsylvania).
125. For a complete discussion of the court's decision to rein in deepening
insolvency, see supra notes 78-105 and accompanying text.
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cession, utilized the CitX holding to rule against plaintiffs seeking to assert
126
deepening insolvency causes of action.
A decision by the highly influential Delaware Court of Chancery in
Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young is particularly noteworthy
because the court expanded on the trepidations manifested in CitX to definitively reject deepening insolvency as an independent cause of action in
Delaware. 12 7 The court, stressing the protection the business judgment
rule provides to directors and other fiduciaries, stated that "the words
'zone of insolvency' should not declare open season on corporate fiduciaries." 1 2 8 The Trenwick decision reflects the underlying concerns that many
12 9
lower courts began to recognize with deepening insolvency claims.
126. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health,
Educ. and Research Found. v. Pricewaterhouse Coopers, LLP, NO. 2:00CV684,
2007 WL 141059, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Jan 17, 2007) (ruling that after CitX negligence
cannot sustain deepening insolvency cause of action); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Radnor Holdings Corp. v. Tennenbaum Capital Ptnrs., LLC
(In re Radnor Holdings Corp.), 353 B.R. 820, 842 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (ruling
that Third Circuit decision in CitX precludes plaintiff from sustaining independent
deepening insolvency claim or utilizing deepening insolvency as proper measure
of damages); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Verestar, Inc. v. Am.
Tower Corp. (In re Verestar, Inc.), 343 B.R. 444, 476 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (rejecting plaintiff's deepening insolvency claim based on CitX ruling and holding
that "to the extent a plaintiff asserts that a director harmed creditors solely by
permitting the corporation to remain in business and incur 'unnecessary' debt,
and alleges no more, the charge must relate to a breach of the duty of care");
Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 207 (Del. Ch.
2006) (utilizing CiIX ruling to reject deepening insolvency claim). But see Alberts v.
Tuft (In re Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. Corp.), 353 B.R. 324, 337 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2006)
("The court is ... unmoved by the Third Circuit's decision to restrict recoveries for
deepening insolvency to actions involving fraud.").
127. See Trenwick, 906 A.2d at 174 ("Put simply, under Delaware law, 'deepening insolvency' is no more of a cause of action when a firm is insolvent than a cause
of action for 'shallowing profitability' would be when a firm is solvent."). But see In
re Fleming Packaging Corp., No. 03-82408, 2006 WL 2587916, at *5 (Bankr. C.D.
Ill. Sept. 8, 2006) (holding that it is "open question whether Delaware will recognize a separate cause of action for deepening insolvency" because "[o] nly the Delaware Supreme Court [and not the Chancery Court] may speak definitively on this
issue"). Insofar as the Delaware Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue,
federal courts are not bound to apply either decision, but may use intermediate
courts to help guide their ruling. See Paolella v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 158 F.3d
183, 189 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that federal courts "may also consider the decisions of state intermediate appellate courts in order to facilitate [their] prediction"); Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1373 n.15 (3d Cir. 1996)
(holding that "[w]hen the state's highest court has not addressed the precise question presented, a federal court must predict how the state's highest court would
resolve the issue").
128. See Trenwick, 906 A.2d at 174 (upholding applicability of business judgment rule to deepening insolvency claims asserted within Delaware).
129. See, e.g., Bondi v. Bank of Am. Corp. (In re Parmalat), 383 F. Supp. 2d
587, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that, under North Carolina law, if corporate officers and directors breach their fiduciary duties by increasing corporation's insolvency, such injury is 'compensable,' but not under theory of deepening
insolvency); Alberts, 333 B.R. at 517 ("The District of Columbia courts have not yet
recognized a cause of action for deepening insolvency. There is no point in recog-
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Namely, suits asserted under deepening insolvency are duplicative in nature and other causes of action, such as breach of fiduciary duty and fraud,
acts committed
sufficiently address and provide remedies for fraudulent
0
by boards of directors of insolvent corporations.13
In the aftermath of CitX and its progeny, some commentators have
begun to question whether the tort of deepening insolvency has any "continuing utility" or whether it has "merely become an 'add on' to fraud
counts in complaints."1 3 1 The combined force of CitX and the growing
number of state courts that have refused to recognize deepening insolplaintiffs
vency as an independent cause of action will likely deter future
1 32
insolvency.
deepening
on
solely
based
claims
asserting
from
V.

THE END OF DEEPENING INSOLVENCY?

Five years ago, trustees' and creditors' committees seemed poised to
plunder the deep pockets of corporations' auditors, directors and lenders
33
under an emerging theory of liability known as deepening insolvency.1

In its recent CitXdecision, the Third Circuit drastically narrowed the misguided expansion of deepening insolvency by predicating deepening insolvency on fraud, emphatically rejecting deepening insolvency as a
measure of damages and limiting the precedential scope of Lafferty to
nizing and adjudicating 'new' causes of action when established ones cover the
same ground."); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of VarTec Telecom, Inc.
v. Rural Tel. Fin. Coop. (In re VarTec Telecom, Inc.), 335 B.R. 631, 644 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that deepening insolvency is substantially duplicated by
torts already established in Texas).
130. See Trenwick, 906 A.2d at 175 (holding that other causes of action addressed deepening insolvency claims). The court emphatically ruled that "if the
board of an insolvent corporation acting with due diligence and good faith, pursues a business strategy that it believes will increase the corporation's value," but
nevertheless involves securing additional debt, "it does not become a guarantor of
that strategy's success." See id. (upholding reasoning behind business judgment
rule). Rather, the board is protected by the business judgment rule. See id.
(same). The VarTec court also discussed the duplicative nature of deepening insolvency, holding that established torts in Texas sufficiently address any harm that
may have occurred. See VarTec Telecom, 335 B.R. 631, 644 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005)
(noting duplicative nature of deepening insolvency).
131. See Brighton, supra note 112, at 77-78 (questioning whether deepening
insolvency has any remaining viable purpose); see also Gordon, supra note 41, at
234 (" [T] here are few, if any, instances where deepening insolvency alone may be
applicable to the exclusion of claims for fraud or breach of fiduciary duty. This...
begs the question of whether there is any need for states to recognize a deepening
insolvency cause of action at all."); John J. Rapisardi, Delaware Court Rejects 'Deepening Insolvency' Theory, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 29, 2006, at 3, 5 (2006) (asserting that CitX
"may have eliminated the efficacy of deepening insolvency as an independent
cause of action by limiting its availability to situations in which it would be redundant to other causes of action, such as fraud").
132. See Brighton, supranote 80, at 69 (concluding that CitX and lower court's
rulings have made deepening insolvency causes of action much more difficult to
assert and maintain).
133. For a discussion of the early development of deepening insolvency, see
supra notes 21-41 and accompanying text.
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Pennsylvania. 134 CitX's rejection of a negligence standard for deepening
insolvency has created new heightened procedural obstacles that markedly
increase the difficulty with which plaintiffs assert such claims. 135 Additionally, CitX's palpable disdain for deepening insolvency has spawned a line
of cases that severely curtail the tort by rejecting it as an independent
cause of action, finding instead that other causes of action based largely
on pre-existing duties are the appropriate means by which to assert a
claim. 136 This growing trend is unlikely to subside in the near future and
has made deepening insolvency claims increasingly difficult (and in some
37
cases entirely impossible) to assert as a valid and independent claim.1
The CitX ruling prudently upheld the applicability of the business judgment rule in the zone of insolvency, which will undeniably increase directors' willingness to salvage distressed entities through the reduced
likelihood of personal liability.' 3 8 Ultimately, the Third Circuit's decision
in CitXis good news for corporate directors, lenders and auditors, who can
now breathe a collective sigh of relief that long overdue common sense
139
has been infused into deepening insolvency jurisprudence.
Ian T. Mahoney

134. See Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey & Assoc., P.C. (In re CitX Corp.), 448 F.3d
672, 677, 681-82, 681 n.ll (3d Cir. 2006) (limiting deepening insolvency). For a
discussion of the CitX ruling, see supra notes 78-105 and accompanying text. For a
complete discussion of the effects of the limitations that CitX placed on deepening
insolvency, and the unmistakable trend in lower courts towards rejecting deepening insolvency as an independent cause of action, see supra notes 106-32 and accompanying text.
135. For a discussion of the added procedural barriers for plaintiffs seeking to
assert deepening insolvency, see supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
136. For a discussion of courts that have rejected deepening insolvency and
instead have held that other causes of actions are the appropriate means to assert
these claims, see supra notes 124-32 and accompanying text.
137. See Brighton, supra note 112, at 76-79 (concluding that CitXand Trenwick
"may have rung the death knell for claims of deepening insolvency"). For a complete discussion of the jurisdictions that have rejected deepening insolvency as an
independent cause of action in the wake of CitX, see supranote 126 and accompanying text.
138. For a thorough analysis of the CitX court's rejection of negligence as a
basis for deepening insolvency and its impact on the business judgment rule, see
supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
139. For a discussion of the wide-reaching positive impact of CitX on lenders,
directors and auditors, see supra notes 106-32 and accompanying text.
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